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1 Introduction
Many companies issue convertible debt as a means of debt financing since 1980 $s$ . There are
already many studies on the valuation of convertible debt (e.g. Ayache et al. [1], Brennan and
Schwartz [2], Ingersoll [5], Sirbu et al. [17], Takahashi et al. [20], Tsiveriotis and Fernandes [21],
Yagi and Sawaki [22], etc.). However, in these studies the tradeoff between tax shield and
bankruptcy cost, and firm value have not been argued. Koziol [8], Liao and Huang [11] and
Sarkar [16],have presented the valuation of convertible debt by the framework of Leland [10], but
the investment has not been taken into account and the optimal capital structure has not been
analyzed. Egami [3] and Lyandres and Zhdanov [12] have investigated the interaction among
firm’s investment and convertible debt financing decision, but the optimal capital structure has
not been analyzed. We examine the optimal strategy for the investment financed by issuing
convertible debt on the optimal capital structure and investigate the consistency with empirical
evidence in Korkeamaki and Moore [7].
Most convertible debt are callable. Liao and Huang [11] and Sarkar [16] have presented the
valuation of callable convertible debt by the framework of Leland [10], but the investment and
optimal capital structure have not been analyzed. Korkeamaki and Moore [6] and Mayers [15]
are the empirical studies on callable convertible debt financing and investment. We suggest
theoretical model about callable convertible debt financing and investment, and discuss the
consistency of our model with empirical evidence.
In this paper we examine the optimal investment strategy of the firm financed by issuing
callable convertible debt on the optimal capital structure. Especially, we investigate how the
issue of callable convertible debt affect the optimal capital structure and the optimal investment
strategies.
2 The Model
Consider a firm with an option to invest at any time by paying a fixed investment cost $I$ . The
firm decides whether to invest, observing a demand shock $X_{t}$ for its product. We suppose the
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firm can observe the demand shock $X_{t},$ $whereX_{t}$ is given by a geometric Brownian motion
$dX_{t}=\mu X_{t}dt+\sigma X_{t}dW_{t}$ , $X_{0}=x$ , (2.1)
where $\mu$ and $\sigma$ are the risk-adjusted expected growth rate and the volatility of $X_{t}$ , respectively,
and $W_{t}$ is a standard Brownian motion defined on a probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ .
We consider a firm which has an option of the investment is financed with equity and convert-
ible debt with coupon payment $c$ and infinite maturity. Once the investment option is exercised,
we assume that the firm can receive instantaneous profit
$\pi(X_{t})=(1-\tau)(QX_{t}-c)$ , (2.2)
where $\tau$ is a constant corporate tax rate and $Q$ is the quantity produced from the asset in place.
Once the investment option has been exercised, the optimal default policy is established
from the issue of debt. The optimal default policy of the equity holders selects the optimal
default time, maximizing the equity value. On the other hand, the optimal conversion policy
of the convertible debt holders selects the optimal conversion time, maximizing the value of
convertible debt. In this case, the optimal problems for the holders of equity and convertible
debt must be solved simultaneously. Here, we assume that the holders of convertible debt can
convert the debt into a fraction $\eta$ of the original equity. We follow Brennan and Schwartz [2]
and assume block conversion, that is, all convertible debt holders exercise the conversion option
at the same time. First, we present the formulations for the values of equity and convertible
debt issued at investment time. After that, we consider the optimal investment strategies.
2.1 The Value of Convertible Debt
In this section we examine the values of equity and convertible debt issued at investment time.
Let $\mathcal{T}_{t_{1},t_{2}}$ be the set of stopping times with respect to the filtration as $\{\mathcal{F}_{s};t_{1}\leq s\leq t_{2}\}$ and
$T_{d}\in \mathcal{T}0,\infty$ and $T_{c}\in \mathcal{T}_{0,\infty}$ be the default and conversion times. Denoting $E(x, c)$ as the total
value of equity issued at investment time and $D_{c}(x, c)$ as that of convertible debt with coupon
payment of $c,$ $E(x, c)$ and $D_{c}(x, c)$ are formulated as
$E(x, c)$ $=$ $\sup_{T_{d}\in \mathcal{T}0\infty},\mathbb{F}_{\{}^{x}[\int_{0}^{T_{c}^{*}(c)\wedge T_{d}}e^{-ru}(1-\tau)(QX_{u}-c)du$
$+1_{\{T_{c}^{*}(c)<T_{d}\}} \frac{1}{1+\eta}\int_{T_{c}^{*}(c)}^{\infty}e^{-ru}(1-\tau)QX_{u}du]$ , (2.3)
$D_{c}(x, c)$ $=$ $\sup_{T_{c}\in \mathcal{T}_{0\infty}}.E_{0}^{x}[\int_{0}^{T_{c}\wedge T_{d}(c)}e^{-ru}cdu+1_{\{T_{d}(c)<T_{c}\}}e^{-rT_{d}(c)}(1-\theta)\epsilon(X_{T_{d}^{*}(c)})$
$+1_{\{T_{c}<T_{d}^{*}(c)\}} \frac{\eta}{1+\eta}\int_{T_{c}}^{\infty}e^{-ru}(1-\tau)QX_{u}du]$ , (2.4)
where $\mathbb{E}_{Y}^{x}$ is the conditional expectation operator given that $X_{t}$ equals $x,$ $r$ is the risk-free interest
rate with $r>\mu,$ $1_{\{T_{\dot{c}}(c)<T_{d}\}}$ is an indicator function that is equal to one if $T_{c}^{*}(c)<T_{d}$ and is equal
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to zero otherwise, $\theta$ is the proportional bankruptcy cost and $\epsilon(x)$ is the total post-investment
profit in which the investment is financed entirely with equity,
$\epsilon(x)=\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}Qx$ . (2.5)
Also, the optimal default and conversion times for any $c,$ $T_{d}^{*}(c)$ and $T_{c}^{*}(c)$ , respectively, are given
by
$T_{d}^{*}(c)$ $=$ $\inf\{T_{d}\in[0, \infty)|X_{T_{d}}\leq x_{d}(c)\}$ , (2.6)
$T_{c}^{*}(c)$ $=$ $\inf\{T_{c}\in[0, \infty)|X_{T_{C}}\geq x_{c}(c)\}$ , (2.7)
where $x_{d}(c)$ and $x_{c}(c)$ are the optimal default and conversion thresholds for any $c$ . Eq. (2.3)
means that the equity holders can receive the tax-deductible earning after paying coupon until
conversion or default and that the equity value is diluted by converting, that is, the dilution
factor is one over one plus eta. On the other hand, Eq. (2.4) implies that the convertible debt
holders can receive the coupon payment until conversion or default and a fraction eta of the
original equity on conversion, and are entitled to $(1-\theta)\epsilon(X_{T_{d}^{*}(c)})$ at bankruptcy.
Once the convertible debt has been converted, the firm becomes an all-equity entity. It
follows from the optimal problems of the equity holders and convertible debt holders in (2.3)
and (2.4), respectively, that the general solutions for the values of equity and convertible debt
prior to default and conversion are given by
$E(x, c)$ $=$ $a_{1}x^{\beta_{1}}+a_{2}x^{\beta_{2}}+(1- \tau)(\frac{Qx}{r-\mu}-\frac{c}{r})$ , (2.8)
$D_{c}(x, c)$ $=$ $a_{3}x^{\beta_{1}}+a_{4}x^{\beta_{2}}+ \frac{c}{r}$ , (2.9)
where $a_{i},$ $i=1,$ $\cdots,$ $4$ are determined by boundary conditions, $\beta_{1}=\frac{1}{2}-\mathscr{F}+\sqrt{(\frac{1}{2}-\Leftrightarrow_{\sigma})^{2}+_{\sigma}\nabla 2r}>$
$1$ and $\beta_{2}=\frac{1}{2}-\Leftrightarrow_{\sigma}-\sqrt{(\frac{1}{2}-*_{\sigma})^{2}+\frac{2}{\sigma}r7}<0$ . The upper boundary conditions which come from
the conversion policy of convertible debt holders are given by
$E(x_{c}(c), c)$ $=$ $\frac{1}{1+\eta}\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}Qx_{c}(c)$ , (210)
$D_{c}(x_{c}(c), c)$ $=$ $\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}Qx_{c}(c)$ . (2.11)
The lower boundary conditions which relate to the default threshold are given by
$E(x_{d}(c), c)$ $=$ $0$ , (2.12)
$D_{c}(x_{d}(c), c)$ $=$ $(1- \theta)\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}Qx_{d}(c)$ . (2.13)
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Substituting Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9) into Eqs. $(2.10)-(2.13)$ , we may determine that
$E(x, c)$ $=$ $(1- \tau)(\frac{Qx}{r-\mu}-\frac{c}{r})-(1-\tau)(\frac{Qx_{d}(c)}{r-\mu}-\frac{c}{r})p_{d}(x, c;x_{c}(c))$
$-(1- \tau)(\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}\frac{Qx_{c}(c)}{r-\mu}-\frac{c}{r})p_{c}(x, c;x_{d}(c))$ , (2.14)
$D_{c}(x, c)$ $=$ $\frac{c}{r}+((1-\theta)\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}Qx_{d}(c)-\frac{c}{r})p_{d}(x, c;x_{c}(c))$
$+(1- \tau)(\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}\frac{Qx_{c}(c)}{r-\mu}-\frac{c}{r})p_{c}(x, c;x_{d}(c))$, (2.15)
where $p_{d}(x, c;x_{c}(c))$ is the expected present values of$l contingent on $X_{t}$ first reaching the de-
fault threshold $x_{d}(c)$ from above before reaching the conversion threshold $x_{c}(c)$ and $p_{c}(x, c;x_{d}(c))$
is that of $1 contingent on $X_{t}$ first reaching the conversion threshold $x_{c}(c)$ from bellow before
reaching the default threshold $x_{d}(c)$ , that is,
$p_{d}(x, c;x_{c}(c))$ $=$ $\frac{x_{c}(c)^{\beta_{1}}x^{\beta_{2}}-x_{c}(c)^{\beta_{2}}x^{\beta_{1}}}{x_{c}(c)^{\beta_{1}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{2}}-x_{c}(c)^{\beta_{2}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{1}}}$ , (216)
$p_{c}(x, c;x_{d}(c))$ $=$ $\frac{x^{\beta_{1}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{2}}-x^{\beta_{2}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{1}}}{x_{c}(c)^{\beta_{1}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{2}}-x_{c}(c)^{\beta_{2}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{1}}}$ . (2.17)
Then, summing the values of equity and convertible debt, the firm value $V(x, c)$ is represented
by
$V(x, c)$ $=$ $E(x, c)+D_{c}(x, c)$
$=$ $\epsilon(x)+\frac{\tau c}{r}(1-p_{d}(x, c;x_{c}(c)))-\theta\epsilon(x_{d}(c))p_{d}(x, c;x_{c}(c))$ . (2.18)
Eq. (2.18) equals the unlevered firm value plus the expected present value of debt tax shields
minus the expected present value of bankruptcy cost\dagger .
Here, we determine the optimal default and conversion thresholds. The optimal default
threshold is determined by the smooth-pasting condition which equals the partial derivation
of $E(x, c)$ with respect to $x$ with the deviation of payoff for the equity holders at the default
threshold $x_{d}(c)$ . On the other hand, the optimal conversion threshold derived from the smooth-
pasting condition which the partial derivation of $D_{c}(x, c)$ with respect to $x$ with the deviation
of payoff for the holders of convertible debt at the conversion threshold $x_{c}(c)$ . Hence,
$\frac{\partial E}{\partial x}(x_{d}(c), c)$ $=$ $0$ , (2.19)
$\frac{\partial D_{c}}{\partial x}(x_{c}(c), c)$ $=$ $\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}$ $Q$ . (2.20)
\dagger From Mauer and Sarkar [13], in the case of straight debt financing the firm value for any coupon payment $s$
is given by
$V(x, s)= \epsilon(x)+\frac{\tau s}{r}(1-(\frac{x}{x_{d}(s)})^{\beta_{2}})-\theta\epsilon(x_{d}(s))(\frac{x}{x_{d}(s)})^{\beta_{2}}$
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Even if substituting Eqs. (2.14) and (2.15) into Eqs. (2.18) and (2.19), the optimal default and
conversion thresholds cannot be solved analytically. Hence, the optimal threshold must be solved
numerically.
2.2 The Investment Strategies
Next, we consider the optimal investment strategy. The optimal capital structure, that is, the
optimal coupon payment is determined from maximizing the firm value given by equation (2.18)
on investment. On the otner hand, the equity holders of the firm which invests selects the
optimal investment time, maximizing the equity value. Letting $T\in \mathcal{T}0,\infty$ be the investment
time, the value of the investment partially financed with convertible debt $F(x)$ is formulated as




$\mathbb{E}_{\{}^{x}[e^{-rT}(V(X_{T}, c)-I)]$ . (2.21)
The optimal investment time $T^{*}$ is given by
$T^{*}= \inf\{T\in[0, \infty)|X_{T}\geq x^{*}\}$ , (2.22)
where $x^{*}$ is the optimal investment thresholds.
From Sundaresan and Wang [19], the optimal coupon payment for any $x$ is given by maxi-
mizing the firm value
$c^{*}(x)= \arg\max_{c>0}V(x, c)$ . (2.23)
From the boundary condition at the investment threshold, the investment value is given by
$F(x)=(V(x^{*}, c^{*}(x^{*}))-I)( \frac{x}{x}*I^{\beta_{1}}$ (2.24)
and the optimal investment threshold is given by the smooth-pasting condition
$\frac{dF}{dx}(x^{*})=\frac{\partial V}{\partial x}(x^{*}, c^{*}(x^{*}))$ . (2.25)
Hence, the optimal capital structure and the optimal investment strategies are determined by
solving nonlinear simultaneous equations (2.23) and (2.25).
3 Numerical Analysis
In this section, the calculation results of the values of equity, convertible debt and the invest-
ment option, the optimal thresholds for default, conversion and investment, the optimal coupon
payments and the optimal leverage ratio are presented in order to investigate how the issue of
convertible debt affects the optimal investment strategies and the optimal capital structure. We
use the following base case parameters: $Q=1,$ $\mu=0,$ $\sigma=0.2,$ $r=0.05,$ $\theta=0.3,$ $\tau=0.3,$ $\eta=$
0.4, $I=5.0$ .
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Fig. 1 shows the values of equity and convertible debt as a function of demand shock $x$ and
Fig. 2 shows the investment value. Under the base parameters, the optimal coupon payment
is $c^{*}=c^{*}(x^{*})=0.420$ , the optimal default threshold is $x_{d}=x_{d}(c^{*})=0.229$ , the optimal
conversion threshold is $x_{c}=x_{c}(c^{*})=3.181$ and the optimal investment threshold is $x^{*}=0.575$ .
Tabs. 1 and 2 represent the optimal coupon payments, the optimal investment threshold,
optimal default threshold, the optimal conversion threshold, the equity value, the debt value
and the optimal leverage ratio. In Tab. 1 we derive the optimal capital structure, that is, the
optimal coupon payment is determined from maximizing the firm value. In Tab. 2 the coupon
payment is determined under the financing constraint, that is, the condition that the investment
cost $I$ is equal to the issue value of convertible debt $D_{c}(x^{*}, c)^{\ddagger}$ .
First, we compare the results in the optimal capital structure case in Tab. 1 with that in the
financing constraint case in Tab. 2. Coupon payments, investment threshold, default threshold,
conversion threshold, debt value and optimal leverage ratio in the optimal capital structure case
is larger than that in the financing constraint case. On the other hand, equity value in the optimal
capital structure case is smaller than that in the financing constraint case. Since the issuance
of debt on the optimal capital structure has no restriction relative to the financing constraint
case, the firm sets a higher coupon payment, delaying the investment. Being leveraged, the firm
issues more convertible debt, so the equity value decreases and then the default occurs earlier.
Also, since the value of conversion option decreases, the conversion occurs later.
We focus on the coupon payments and the investment, default and conversion thresholds
with respect to volatility $\sigma$ when the conversion ratio $\eta$ equals 0.4. When volatility increases,
the investment and conversion threshold in both cases also increases and the default threshold in
the financing constraint case decreases. In standard real options model, it’s noted that increase
in volatility leads to delaying decision-making. On the other hand, the default threshold in
the optimal capital structure case increases when volatility increases. On the optimal capital
structure, since the firm finances with higher coupon payment in higher volatility, the default
occurs earlier. Hence, the possibility of default increases. Also, when volatility increases, the
optimal coupon payment increases, while the coupon payment in the financing constraint case
decreases. Since the value of conversion option increases in volatility and the issue of debt for
the coupon payment in the financing constraint case is limited, the firm must set lower coupon
payments.
Next, we analyze the coupon payments, the investment and default thresholds and equity
value with respect to conversion ratio $\eta$ when the volatility is equal to 0.2. When conversion ratio
increases, the default threshold in the optimal capital structure case increases, while threshold
in the financing constraint case decreases. As the conversion ratio is higher, the equity value
is more diluted. On the optimal capital structure, since the issue of debt has no restriction,
the decrease in the equity value becomes apparent and the default occurs earlier. This result
on the optimal capital structure is consistent with the results in Koziol [8]. Also, in the case
of higher volatility $(\sigma=0.3, \sigma=0.4)$ , the coupon payment in the both cases decreases when
the conversion ratio $\eta$ increases. In the case of lower volatility $(\sigma=0.2)$ , when conversion ratio
\ddagger Tab. 2 uses the same constraint as Egami [3]: $I=D_{c}(x^{*}, c)$ .
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increases, the optimal coupon payment increases, while the coupon payment in the financing
constraint case decreases. On the optimal capital structure, the equity value decreases and the
value of conversion option also decreases in lower volatility. Hence, the firm sets higher coupon
payment, and issues more convertible debt.
Tab. 3 represents the coupon payments and the investment threshold in the cases of straight
and convertible debt financing and the difference of the investment threshold in both financing
cases when $r=$ 0.03,0,05,0.07, $\mu=$ -0.12,0,0.12 and $\sigma=$ 0.2,0.3,0.4. Korkeamaki and
Moore [7] show that the firm with high-growth prospection, high volatility, and low capital costs
issuing convertible debt tends to defer investment longer. These results on Tab. 3 are consistent
with that in Korkeamaki and Moore [7].
$E,$ $D_{c}$
Figure 1: The values of equity and convertible debt
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Table 3: The effect of early and late investment on straight dent and convertible debt financing
4 Call Provisions
In this section we consider the firm which is financed with callable convertible debt. The
formulation of the value of investment option and optimal capital structure are the same as in
the case of non-callable convertible debt financing in Sec. 2. We reformulate the values of equity
and callable convertible debt. If the convertible debt has the call provision, the equity holders
can redeem (buy back) the debt. When the equity holders call the debt, the convertible debt
holders can select either to receive a call price or to convert the debt into the equity. Let $\gamma c/r$
be the call price. Denoting $T_{l}\in \mathcal{T}0,\infty$ as the call time, the equity value $E(x, c)$ and the value of
callable convertible debt $D_{c}(x, c)$ are formulated as
$E(x, c)= \sup_{\tau_{d},\tau_{\iota\in \mathcal{T}0,\infty}}\Re[\int_{0}^{T_{c}(c)\wedge T_{d}\wedge T_{l}}e^{-ru}(1-\tau)(QX_{u}-c)du$
$+$ $1_{\{T_{C^{*}}(c)<(T_{d}\wedge T_{l})\}} \frac{1}{1+\eta}\int_{T_{\dot{c}}(c)}^{\infty}e^{-ru}(1-\tau)QX_{u}du$
$+$ $1_{\{T_{l}<(T_{c}(c)\wedge T_{d})\}} \{\int_{T_{l}}^{\infty}e^{-ru}(1-\tau)QX_{u}du$
$-e^{-rT_{l}} \max(\gamma\frac{c}{r},$ $\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}\int_{T_{l}}^{\infty}e^{-ru}(1-\tau)QX_{u}du)\}]$ , (4.1)
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$D_{c}(x, c)= \sup_{T_{c}\in \mathcal{T}_{0\infty}},\mathbb{F}_{\{}^{x}[\int_{0}^{T_{c}\wedge T_{l}^{*}(c)\wedge T_{d}^{*}(c)}e^{-ru}cdu$
$+$ $1_{\{T_{c}<(T_{l}^{*}(c)\wedge T_{d}^{*}(c))\}} \frac{\eta}{1+\eta}\int_{T_{c}}^{\infty}e^{-ru}(1-\tau)QX_{u}du$
$+$ $1_{\{T_{d}^{*}(c)<(T_{c}\wedge T_{l}^{*}(c))\}}e^{-rT_{d}^{*}(c)}(1-\theta)\epsilon(X_{T_{d}^{*}(c)})$
$+$ $1_{\{T_{l}^{*}(c)<(T_{c}\wedge T_{d}^{*}(c))\}}e^{-rT_{l}^{*}(c)} \max(\gamma\frac{c}{r},$ $\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}\int_{T_{l}^{*}(c)}^{\infty}e^{-ru}(1-\tau)QX_{u}du)]$
(4.2)
The optimal call time for any $c,$ $T_{l}^{*}(c)$ is given by
$T_{l}^{*}(c)= \inf\{T_{l}\in[0, \infty)|X_{T_{l}}\geq x_{l}(c)\}$ , (4.3)
where $x_{l}(c)$ is the optimal call threshold for any $c$ . Similar to the case of non-callable convertible
debt financing, the general solutions for the values of equity and callable convertible debt prior
to default, conversion and call are given by Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9), respectively.
When the demand level $X_{t}$ is lower, the default occurs. On the other hand, when the
demand level $X_{t}$ is higher, the either conversion or call occurs. The conversion occurs before
the call, that is, if thresholds for conversion and call satisfies $x_{c}(c)<x_{l}(c)$ , the values of equity
and convertible debt are equal to that in the non-callable convertible debt financing case in
Eqs. (2.14) and (2.15). Here, we consider the case that the call occurs before the conversion,
that is, $x_{l}(c)<x_{c}(c)$ . Once the equity holders decides to call, the convertible debt holders
convert the debt into equity when the conversion value is higher than call price. In other words,
the equity holders force the convertible debt holders to convert into equity. Since the forcing-
conversion occurs when the conversion value is equal to the call price, the upper boundary
conditions in the case that the convertible debt is redeemed at the call price, which come from
the call policy of equity holders are given by
$E(x_{l}(c), c)$ $=$ $\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}Qx_{l}(c)-\gamma\frac{c}{r}$ , (4.4)
$D_{c}(x_{l}(c), c)$ $=$ $\gamma\frac{c}{r}$ . (4.5)
Since the lower boundary conditions are given by Eqs. (2.12) and (2.13) as in the case of non-
callable convertible debt financing, the values of equity and callable convertible debt are given
by
$E(x, c)$ $=$ $(1- \tau)(\frac{Qx}{r-\mu}-\frac{c}{r})-(1-\tau)(\frac{Qx_{d}(c)}{r-\mu}-\frac{c}{r})p_{d}(x, c;x_{l}(c))$
$+$ $(1- \tau-\gamma)\frac{c}{r}p_{l}(x, c;x_{d}(c))$ , (4.6)
$D_{c}(x, c)$ $=$ $\frac{c}{r}+((1-\theta)\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}Qx_{d}(c)-\frac{c}{r})p_{d}(x, c;x_{l}(c))$
$+$ $( \gamma-1)\frac{c}{r}p_{l}(x, c;x_{d}(c))$ , (4.7)
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where $p_{l}(x, c;x_{d}(c))$ is that of$l contingent on $X_{t}$ first reaching the call threshold $x_{l}(c)$ from
bellow before reaching the default threshold $x_{d}(c)$ , that is,
$p_{l}(x, c;x_{d}(c))= \frac{x^{\beta_{1}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{2}}-x^{\beta_{2}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{1}}}{x_{l}(c)^{\beta_{1}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{2}}-x_{l}(c)^{\beta_{2}}x_{d}(c)^{\beta_{1}}}$ . (4.8)
Then, the firm value is represented by
$V(x, c)$ $=$ $\epsilon(x)+\frac{\tau c}{r}(1-p_{d}(x, c;x_{l}(c))-p_{l}(x, c;x_{d}(c)))-\theta\epsilon(x_{d}(c))p_{d}(x, c;x_{l}(c))$ . $(4.9)$
In order to determine the optimal default and call thresholds, we derive the smooth-pasting
condition on the default and call thresholds. Both thresholds are determined by the conditions
which equal the partial derivation of $E(x, c)$ with respect to $x$ with the deviation of payoff for
the equity holders at the default threshold $x_{d}(c)$ and the call threshold $x_{l}(c)$ . Hence,
$\frac{\partial E}{\partial x}(x_{d}(c), c)$ $=$ $0$ , (410)
$\frac{\partial E}{\partial x}(x_{l}(c), c)$ $=$ $\frac{1-\tau}{r-\mu}$ $Q$ . (4.11)
Since the optimal default and call thresholds cannot be also solved analytically, the optimal
threshold must be solved numerically.
4.1 Numerical Analysis
Here, to investigate how the issue of callable convertible debt affects the optimal investment
strategy and the optimal capital structure, we present the calculation results. We use the base
case parameters as in the case of non-callable convertible debt financing : $Q=1,$ $\mu=0,$ $\sigma=$
0.2, $r=0.05,$ $\theta=0.3,$ $\tau=0.3,$ $\eta=0.4,$ $I=5.0$ .
Fig. 3 shows the optimal investment thresholds on the optimal coupon payment and on the
constant coupon payment which uses the coupon payment in the non-callable convertible debt
financing case when the size of call price $\gamma$ changes. In the optimal coupon payment case, the
investment threshold decreases when $\gamma$ increases. On the other hand, the investment threshold
increases in the constant coupon payment case. Korkeamaki and Moore [6] describe that the firm
financing with callable convertible debt invests earlier than that with non-callable convertible
debt. As Fischer, et al. [4], Leary and Roberts [9], Mauer and Triantis [14] and Strebulaev [18]
show that firms significantly deviate from target optimal capital structures for extended periods
of time even when there are small adjustment costs, the results in Korkeamaki and Moore [6]
are consistent with the results in the case of constant coupon payment.
In the optimal coupon payment case, when $\gamma\geq 1.82$ , the conversion occurs before the forcing-
conversion or call, that is, $x_{c}(c)<(x_{f}(c) A x_{l}(c))$ . Also, when $0.67\leq\gamma<1.82$ , the forcing
conversion occurs before the conversion or call, that is, $xf(c)<(x_{c}(c) A x_{l}(c))$ . If $\gamma<0.67$ ,
the call occurs before the conversion or forcing-conversion, that is, $x_{l}(c)<(x_{c}(c)\wedge x_{f}(c))$ . We
can find the boundaries for the size of call price $\gamma$ between conversion and forcing-conversion
and between forcing-conversion and call. Let 7 be the boundary for $\gamma$ between conversion and
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forcing-conversion and $\underline{\gamma}$ be the boundary between forcing-conversion and call.
Fig. 4 shows the two boundaries 7 and $\underline{\gamma}$ for volatility $\sigma$ . Sarkar [16] shows that the band
for coupon payment, (which leads to the forcing-conversion threshold) widens as the volatility
increases. The high(low) coupon payment in Sarkar [16] has the same meaning of the low(high)
call price in this paper. When the call price is lower, the firm must give up the tax shield by
calling early. On the other hand, when the call price is higher, the value of conversion option
becomes more valuable with higher $\sigma$ . Then, it becomes more relevant in the call decision. This
result is also consistent with the results in Sarkar [16].
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the optimal investment strategies of the firm financed by
issuing callable convertible debt. On the optimal capital structure, we found that the firm
with higher volatility finances with higher coupon payment, delaying investment. Hence, the
possibility of default is higher. Also, the default of the firm financing with convertible debt occurs
earlier than that with straight debt (Koziol [8]). Furthermore, on the optimal capital structure
the firm with high-growth prospection, high volatility, and low capital costs issuing convertible
debt tends to defer investment longer (Korkeamaki and Moore [7]). The firm financing with
callable convertible debt invests earlier than that with non-callable convertible debt (Koreamaki
and Moore [6] $)$ . Using non-optimal coupon payment, the range leading to the forcing-conversion
threshold widens as the volatility increases (Sarkar [16]). In the future, we will examine the
effect of outstanding convertible debt on investment decisions.
$x^{*}$
$x=0.67$ $\overline{\gamma}=1.82$
Figure 3: The investment threshold for the size of call price
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$\gamma$
Figure 4: The optimal regions of the size of call price for volatility
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